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1. INTRODUCTION 
Efficiency plays an important role in the operation of firms.  If firms are pursing a 
policy of shareholder wealth maximisation, this implies that maximum efficiency is 
extracted from a firm’s resources during the production process, or that the minimum 
quantity of inputs are used to achieve a desired level of output.  This is especially true in 
the case of labour demand and labour usage, as wage expenditure constitutes a significant 
portion of the average firm’s cost structure. 
Knowledge of relative inefficiencies in labour usage will therefore be of great 
interest to firm and, as such, academic studies on efficiency of labour demand in firms 
have been relatively forthcoming.  These include work on the Indian farming industry 
[Kumbhakar (1996), Swedish social insurance offices [Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson 
(1991)], Tunisian Manufacturing [Haouras, et al. (2003) and Kalimantanian rice 
production [Padoch (1985)]. 
However, there is relatively little in the way of research conducted on efficiency 
within the banking sector, and even less on the banking sectors of developing economies 
[Berger and Humphrey (1997)], despite an increase in research activity in such areas over 
the last ten years.  This is unfortunate, as banks and financial institutions are the most 
important organisations in overall financial intermediation and economic acceleration of 
a country, in no small part due to their significant role of converting deposits into 
productive investment. [Podder and Mamun (2004)].   
The process of liberalisation and modernisation is vitally important in this 
particular case.  Because of the unique position that it occupies within the framework of 
an economy, the banking industry tends to be more heavily regulated and scrutinised than 
other industries.  This trend is particularly apparent in developing economies, where 
banks tend to exhibit poor performance as a result of overly prohibitive regulation 
[Kumbakhar and Sarkar (2003)].  Thus, tests of labour demand efficiency can be made 
more meaningful by including some comparison of efficiency both pre and most 
modernisation.  Not only will this paper seek to make comparisons of labour demand 
efficiency between India and Pakistan, but will also examine changes in the efficiency of 
labour demand in both the pre and post deregulation periods.   
 
Shabbar Jaffry <shabbar.jaffry@port.ac.uk> is Reader in Economics, Yaseen Ghulam <yaseen. 
ghulam@port.ac.uk> is Director of Postgraduate Programme in Economics, and Joe Cox <joe.cox@port.ac.uk> is 
Lecturer, Department of Economics, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth, UK. 
Jaffry, Ghulam, and Cox 
 
1086
2.  CASE STUDIES 
A major component of this study will be an examination of the banking sectors 
of developing economies, and their response to changes in the regulatory 
environment.  In the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of developing economies 
undertook extensive processes of liberalisation and modernisation, particularly with 
respect to financial and banking industries.  The developed world led the way in this 
respect, with most notably the USA experiencing productivity and efficiency 
increases as a result of the relaxation of the country’s regulatory environment.   
A number of studies have documented this phenomenon within various American 
industries, including air transportation, telecommunication and freight transportation.  
Theory does not dictate a clear expected result of deregulation and modernisation in the 
banking sector in terms of labour efficiency gains (or losses), as the consequences of 
deregulation may depend on industry conditions prior to the deregulation process, as well 
as the type of deregulation employed [Berger and Humphrey (1997)]. 
Bonnaccorsi di Patti and Hardy (2005) examined the efficiency of the Pakistani 
Banking sector in isolation.  Over the period of modernisation, they observe an increase 
in efficiency as a result of the new competitive environment resulting from the first round 
of deregulation.  It was also found that new private banks sometimes outperformed 
foreign banks in terms of efficiency.   
As a result of this, studies of efficiency in banking, however have not displayed as 
clear-cut trends as are illustrated in the above examples.  Expectations upon the result of 
the modernisation and deregulation of the banking industries in the countries of the 
Indian sub-continent are therefore unclear. 
 
2.1.  The Indian Banking Sector 
India is a country in the heart of the Indian sub-continent of South Asia and has the 
second largest population in the world.  The country was a part of the British Empire 
until it was recognised as a republic shortly after the end of the Second World War.  
Owing to its large population India’s GDP purchasing power per capita works out to be 
just US$3,262, ranked 120th in the World by the World Bank.  India has shed its 
dependence on agriculture since it has become a republic.  Now, some of the fastest 
growing industries include IT, textiles and mining. 
Banking has also become an emerging industry in the modern era.  The Bengal 
Bank was the first British patronised modern bank in India, and was established in 1784. 
There are currently a total of 361 different banks in India—27 Nationalised commercial 
banks, 30 local private banks, 40 foreign commercial banks, 196 regional rural banks and 
68 Co-operative banks.  The banking sector in India has historically been highly 
regulated, but gradually the restrictions imposed by such a regime are being lifted.  The 
first ‘wave’ of reform began in 1969, when fourteen major banks were nationalised.  Six 
more commercial banks were nationalised in 1980.  A number of new reforms were 
introduced during the period 1992-1997.  These include a reduction in reserve 
requirements, privatisation of public sector banks, interest rate deregulation, and an effort 
to remove barriers to market entry.  As such, the Indian banking sector is currently in a 
transitional phase.  Public sector banks are also trying to reduce manpower, non-
performing assets and government equity.  Foreign direct investment ceilings have also 
increased under the reforms.   
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However, since the early 1990s, public sector banks have found it extremely 
difficult to compete against private sector banks and foreign banks.  In response to this, 
public sector banks are in the process of cutting excessive use of manpower and non-
performing assets, as is their right under the new reforms.  Other responses to 
deregulation and modernisation have included an increase in the volume of merger and 
acquisition activity, an increase in the use of technology, an increased usage of 
diversification and more sophisticated risk management techniques. 
Looking to the future, there has been (and continues to be) an attitude towards the 
gradual reduction of interest rates by India.  GDP growth is expected to continue rising at 
a rate of around 6 percent per annum.    Foreign banks are also likely to meet with more 
success due to their use of innovative technology and increased freedom afforded by 
reforms.  Indian banks are also expected to move towards a more streamlined and 
efficient workforce over the coming years.   
 
2.2.  The Pakistani Banking Sector 
Pakistan also gained independence from the British Empire at the same time as India, 
with a Pakistani central bank established in 1948.  Currently, there are a total of 45 different 
banks in Pakistan—5 Nationalised commercial banks, 16 local private banks, 19 foreign 
commercial banks and 5 specialised development banks.  Whilst initially the country was very 
poor, with a significant portion of national wealth generated from agricultural activities, in the 
modern era the country growth rat has been consistently above the world average.   
Despite impressive rates of growth in GDP in recent years, the country 
experienced an economic slowdown in the early 1990s as a result of poor policy 
making where the activities of Pakistani banks were focused around subsidising the 
fiscal deficit, serving a few large corporations and engaging in trade financing 
[Husain (2005)].  Additionally the financial system suffered from political 
interference in lending decisions and also in the appointment of banking managers.  
In response to some of these problems, a period of de-regulation and financial 
liberalisation was implemented in the early and late 1990s. These included strengthening 
of prudential regulations, a market driven exchange rate system, and the appointment of 
independent persons to the board of directors of nationalised banks and an enhanced 
capital adequacy requirement and a reduction in the restriction on branching. 
Reform of the banking sector is now entering a second phase, where local banks 
are being asked to raise their paid capital, follow a maximum disclosure requirement and 
make full provision against non-performing loans.  Foreign banks have thrived in the past 
due to significant investments in technology, including ATMs and credit cards.  
However, at the current point in time, many foreign banks are selling to local banks 
[Kazmi (2002)].  The fall in fortunes of foreign banks can be put down to, in part, an 
increased confidence in privatised domestic banks. 
There are a number of factors that are expected to play a part in the development 
of the Pakistani banking sector, including a gradual reduction in interest rates, an increase 
in merger and acquisition activity, banks attempting to enter the market for consumer 
finance, the introduction of new technology and a reduction in non-performing loans.  
There has also been a rapid rise in branch networks.  In 2005, thanks to the ongoing 
process of reform, almost 80 percent of the banking sector was in private hands [World 
Bank Report (2005)].   
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3.  FINDINGS OF OTHER RESEARCH 
This paper seeks to examine the labour demand efficiency of the banking sectors 
in India and Pakistan, using the framework outlined by Heshmati (2002), and used in his 
analysis of labour efficiency within Swedish savings banks.  This study will focus on the 
time period 1985–2003, which is characterised within the Indian sub-continent as a 
period of significant reform, deregulation and liberalisation in both countries’ respective 
banking sectors.  
Even though this paper adopts Heshmati (2002)’s approach, it is worth noting that 
here are a number of alternative approaches to the measurement of the efficiency of 
labour demand.   Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), for example, use TFP growth as the 
measure of banking performance over the period 1985-1996, including both labour and 
capital are the variable inputs, while equity and reserves are a quasi-fixed input. The 
study finds that there is a significant over employment of labour relative to capital, 
particularly in the public sector, both pre and post deregulation. In contrast to this, 
Atkinson and Primon (2002) formulate shadow distance and shadow cost systems using 
panel data for 43 US utilities over 37 years and diagnose an over-use of capital relative to 
labour and energy and the under-use of energy relative to labour. 
Baltagi and Rich (2004) develop a general index time path for technical change 
between production and non-production labour in US manufacturing industries between 
1959–1996. Their findings confirm that substantial reductions in the relative share of 
labour in the production process is attributable to a sustained period of non-neutral 
technical change. The general index approach also explains observed shifts in relative 
labour demand as a combination of price-induced substitution, output effects and skill-
biased technical change responses. 
In terms of studies focusing on banking, Gjirja uses a translog stochastic frontier 
input requirement model to assess efficiency in Swedish Bank’s use of labour over the 
period between 1982 and 1998.  The study illustrates how deregulation in Sweden 
positively affected productivity growth, but had no positive impact on the efficiency of 
labour use.  The study also notes that banks were not able to catch up with the expansion 
of the labour use frontier over time.   
Heshmanti (2002) also studies the Swedish banking sector over the period of 
deregulation in the 1980s, and banking crisis in 1992, looking at a panel of 52 savings 
banks.  The study concludes that the process (and anticipation) of deregulation had a 
significant affect upon banks’ choices of input and output volumes.  The study concludes 
that very small banks tend to operate with a technically optimal size of labour, as the 
model output indicates a negative relationship between technical efficiency and the size 
of banks. 
Battese, et al. (2000) also examine Swedish Banks covering the period from 1984 to 
1995.  The study concludes that inefficiency is positive over this period, and has 
increased—indicating that the ‘average’ bank did not manage to catch up with the labour 
use frontier.  The study concludes that Sweden might have expected greater effects from 
deregulation and crisis on labour efficiency and points to the competitive pressure from 
abroad remaining weak as one of the possible reasons why this was so. 
Estache and Rossi (2004) investigate the impacts of different regulatory 
environments upon the efficiency of firms.  The study indicates that privatised firms 
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operating under price-cap and similar ‘hybrid’ schemes are more efficient in their use of 
labour than both public firms and privatised firms under rate-of-return regulations, and 
that privatised firms operating under rate-of-return regulation have, at most, similar 
labour efficiency as public firms.  
Soderbom and Teal (2004) investigate efficiency within the developing African 
economies and show that the Cobb-Douglas functional form adequately captures 
efficiency in production technology. The study also concludes that large firms facing 
higher relative labour costs than smaller firms use a much more capital intensive 
technology and operate with costs 20–25 percent higher than those which would occur if 
factor prices differentials across firms of differing sizes could be eliminated. 
There have also been a number of studies conducted analysing firm’s response in 
terms of risk preference in the post-deregulation period. Just and Pope (1978), for 
example, say that risk adverse producers take into account both the mean and variance of 
output when ranking different technologies, and that this can have an effect upon relative 
efficiency levels.  Rao (2004) investigates cost efficiencies and its relationship with risk-
return behaviour of banks in United Arab Emirates by using Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
in both translog and flexible Fourier forms.   The authors detect substantial inefficiencies.  
In addition, the study concludes that domestic and large banks were less cost efficient 
than foreign and small banks. The study also revealed a positive and significant 
relationship between cost efficiencies and levels of capitalisation 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The model to be used in this study is from Heshmati (2002), itself adapted from 
the work outlined in Aigner, et al. (1977).  In this paper, Heshmati expresses the function 
of labour demand as: 
)exp(),,,( ε= tqwyfh j    
υ+µ=ε  … … … … … … … (1) 
Where h is units of labour measured in hours, f represents the production 
technology and yi (j = 1,2,…, M) are services produced using labour, w is wage, q is a 
vector of quasi-fixed factors and t is time effects.  This function estimates the minimum 
amount of labour required to produce a given level of output.  The error term in this 
equation is decomposed into two distinct parts (µ and υ), representing technical 
efficiency and factors beyond the control of banks respectively.  In addition to these two, 
the bank’s production technology will also have an effect upon their demand for labour. 
If the µ component of the error term is greater than or equal to zero, the firm 
displays a level of technical inefficiency [Aigner, et al. (1977)], as the firm has used more 
labour than was technically necessary in order to produce a given level of output.  A 
bank, which displays s a µ value of zero, can claim to be fully efficient in the use of 
labour.  The υ component of the error term can be both positive and negative.  Due to its 
presence, therefore, the labour demand frontier is stochastic even when µ is set to zero. 
If risk functions are also taken into account, then the model is redefined 
appropriately.  Again, as from Heshmati (2002), Robinson and Barry (1987) and Just and 
Pope (1978).  When doing so, the model then becomes:  
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));(exp();( εβα= xgxfh  … … … … … … (2) 
Where x = (y,w,q,t), with  f(x;α) representing the demand part and g(x;β)ε 
representing the variance part of the demand function.  The model can also be re-
specified in log linear form. 
εβ+α= );();(lnln xgxfh  … … … … … … (3) 
 
5.  DATA 
Panel data is taken from a selection of Indian and Pakistani banks, covering the 
period 1985–2003.  The data were taken from the annual reports of 73 Indian and 41 
Pakistani banks, and are each provided at bank levels, rather than at the individual branch 
level. Any conclusions generated form this study can therefore only be made at a bank 
level.  Unlike Das, et al. (2005), specific branch level analysis is not possible using the 
data available for this study. 
The panel consists of 114 Indian and Pakistani commercial banks observed for 
19 years (from 1985 to 2003), and is unbalanced as not all banks were in existence 
for the whole sample period. Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1 
(below).  
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics of the India and Pakistani (Combined) Commercial  
Banks, 1985–2003 (in real 2000 US dollars) 
Variable Variable Name N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Idnr Bank ID 1681 51.45 32.88 1 114 
Period Year 1681 1994 5 1985 2003 
Lcost (c) Labour Cost (mill.) 1681 103.39 288.34 0.07 4382.31 
Hours (h) Labour Hours (mill.) 1681 26.29 62.93 0.03 575.16 
Wage (w) Hourly wage rate  1681 5.60 5.31 0.71 57.72 
Fixass (q) Fixed assets (mill.)  1681 46.09 89.27 0.00 944.50 
Loans (y1)  Loans  (mill.)  1681 2582.83 7287.54 0.64 101113.76 
Inv (y2) Investment  (mill.)  1681 2270.79 5562.63 0.00 63210.30 
Deposits y3) Deposits  (mill.)  1681 4592.03 11331.70 3.17 155534.23 
Brans (y4) Branches 1681 595 1134 1 9089 
T (t) Time trend 1681 10.32 5.34 1 19 
Size Size of the bank 1681 2.42 1.52 1 5 
Type Type of bank 1681 1.98 0.81 1 3 
Qty Quality 1681 6.30 3.28 0.01 14.94 
Lar   Risk 1681 42.82 10.57 4.91 82.27 
Notes: Type of bank includes three categories: public, private, foreign. 
Quality=capital to asset ratio= (capital + reserves)/total assets)*100. 
Risk= loans to assets ratio= (Total loans/Total assets)*100. 
Type of banks includes three categories: public, private, foreign. 
Size of banks includes five categories: very small, small, medium, large and very large based on 
number of employees. 
Labour hours= labour*2400. 
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Outputs and inputs are chosen as per policy objectives of the individual banks, as 
well as those of the regulatory reforms within the respective countries. The specific 
variables used in the analysis include the total quantity of labour hours used (h), wages 
(w), loans (y1), investment (y2), deposits (y3), number of branches (y4), fixed assets (q), 
and a time trend (t) representing exogenous rates of technical change. The wages, loans, 
deposits, investment, fixed assets and total labour costs are provided in constant 2000 
prices United States Dollar (USD) values to make the data comparable between India and 
Pakistan.  Labour is measured in hours used per year. As the data on number of hours 
worked for each employee is not available, we have used a rough proxy figure of 2400 
considering 300 working days and eight hours per day work.   The ‘wage’ variable is 
defined as hourly wages—an aggregate measure of the cost associated with the hiring of 
labour, including payroll taxes. The quasi-fixed variable, q, is defined as the sum of fixed 
assets. Quality and risk variables are used in the regression stages to control for 
heterogeneity in risk taking behaviour.   
In this study, the variables loans, investment deposits and branches are regarded as 
outputs. The literature is divided as to whether certain variables are an input or an output.  
Berger and Humphry (1997), for example, see deposits as outputs (what is known as a 
value-added approach). In the case of this study, it is important to define whether total 
number of branches is considered to be an input or an output.  In this case, as with 
Heshmati (2002) and Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), the number of branches is 
considered an output variable.   
It is worth noting at this stage how the ‘size’ variable was constructed.  A size 
distribution is calculated by the number of employees of each bank, with the following 
restrictions: 
 
Table 2 
Construction of ‘Size’ Variable 
Number of Bank Employees Resultant ‘Size’ Classification 
Employees ≤ 1,000 1 
1,000 < Employees ≤ 5,000 2 
5,000 < Employees ≤ 10,000 3 
10,000 < Employees ≤ 20,000 4 
Employees  > 20,000 5 
 
From the total sample of data, 1 percent of observations was determined to be 
excessively large or small outliers, and was resultantly excluded from the model.  The 
regression outlined below was subsequently run for the combined dataset. In order to 
make country specific technical efficiency scores apparent, individual bank specific 
efficiencies are calculated and then separated by years, size classes, types of ownership 
and countries. 
A flexible translog functional form (which is linear in parameters) is then used to 
approximate f (.).  The model can therefore be specified as follows; 
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where h, y, w and q are variables which are defined above, i is an index of 
banks…i (1 . . . N),  t represents an index of time…t (1 . . .  T) and both j and k…j; k (1 . . 
. M) are indices of outputs.  Finally, the exogenous rate of technical change is represented 
by λt.  
The key to this Equation is the bank, which performs best in terms of technical 
efficiency within the sample.  We assume that this particular bank is fully efficient (hence 
the µ value for this bank is equal to 0).  All other banks in the sample are assumed to be 
inefficient to a certain degree, the extent of which is determined relative to the single, 
fully efficient bank. 
One of the drawbacks associated with this method is that the ‘fully efficient’ bank 
may not always be the best in all of the time periods used in the study.  For this reason, 
following Schmidt and Sickles (1984), a time variant technical inefficiency score is 
calculated (relative to the banks with best performances in each year) as:  
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And technical efficiency as 
)exp( itit TINEFFTINEFF −=  … … … … … (6) 
Which, as Heshmati (2002) points out, is both bank and time specific. The 
expectations on the first order coefficients are as with Heshmati (2002), where αj and αq 
are expected to be positive and αw negative, which can be interpreted s the elasticity of 
labour demand with respect to output, quasi-fixed inputs and wages respectively.  These 
expectations are only valid at the normalised data point, with the corresponding 
elasticities (which are both bank and time specific) for all data points derived respectively 
as follows. 
itjqitjwkitjkkjjititj
qwyyhE lnlnlnln/ln α+α+αΣ+α=∂∂=  … … (7)  
itwqkitjwkitwwwititw
qywwhE lnlnlnln/ln α+αΣ+α+α=∂∂=  … … (8) 
itwqkitjqkitqqqititq wyqqhE lnlnlnln/ln α+αΣ+α+α=∂∂=   … … (9) 
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And the time specific elasticity of labour with respect to time (the exogenous rate of 
technical change) is derived as:  
)(/ln 1−λ−λ=∂∂= ttitt thE   … … … … … (10) 
 
6.  ESTIMATION AND EXPLANATION 
The model used in this study follows the approximation outlined in Heshmati 
(2002) and detailed above.   The model outlined in Equation (4) is firstly used to estimate 
labour demand function for a sample of Indian and Pakistani commercial banks observed 
for nineteen-year period between 1985-2003. Estimates of the demand function, (f) and 
the variance function, (g) regression results are presented in Appendix A. A majority of 
the bank-specific variables are statistically significant from zero.  The variance function, 
(g), outlined above, was estimated using the weighted non-linear method. The results can 
be seen in Table 3, below, and in the Appendix A.  
 
Labour Demand Elasticity and Productivity Growth 
The elasticities of labour demand with respect to different outputs, wages and 
fixed assets were calculated for bank and time specific. The mean values are reported in 
Table 3 (above) by years, bank size, type of ownership and country. At the mean data 
point, all elasticities with the exception of wage and time elasticities are positive and 
significant, indicating that there is a degree of responsiveness of labour demand to 
changes in the levels of outputs and wages and fixed assets.  These are similar results to 
those provided by Heshmati (2002).  Labour demand elasticity with respect to the output 
‘loans’ is negative for a number of specific bank sizes—namely small, large, very large 
and public banks.  It is possible that some large or small banks are leaning toward an 
‘arm’s length’ approach to banking, perhaps using less labour and more automation in 
order to generate new loans. 
In relative terms, the sample mean elasticities of labour with respect to ‘loans’ and 
‘investments’ are quite small, taking values of 0.031, 0.054 respectively (although these 
are still slightly higher than Heshmati’s estimates of the same elasticities applied to 
Swedish savings banks), with standard deviations which are not unusually large in either 
case.  Both of these elasticities are steadily decreasing over time, suggesting that loans 
and investment have become less labour intensive outputs for Indian and Pakistani banks 
over time.  ‘Deposits’ have larger labour demand elasticity than either of these two 
outputs, with a sample mean elasticity of 0.175 and a standard deviation of 0.057.  This 
means that ‘deposits’ are a significantly more labour intensive output than ‘loans’ and 
‘investments’.  
The largest of the output elasticities is that which relates to ‘branches’, with a 
mean elasticity of 0.452 and a standard deviation of 0.009. We can conclude from this 
that ‘branches’ is the most labour-intensive banking service offered in India and Pakistan, 
and this degree of elasticity is very unlikely to be significantly different across the 
number of banks included in the sample.  This is a result that is to be expected, showing 
that a marginal change in the number of branches will have the largest marginal effect on 
labour demand of all outputs. 
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Table 3 
Mean Input and Output Elasticities and Marginal Effects by Year, Size and Type of  
Banks (Indian and Pakistani (Combined) Commercial Banks) 
 Output Inputs  
 Loans 
(y1) 
Investment 
(y2) 
Deposits 
(y3) 
Branches 
(y4) 
Wages 
(w) 
Fixed Asst 
(q) 
Time 
(t) 
TME Efficiency 
A. Labour Demand Elasticity 
1985 0.058 0.119 0.094 0.443 –0.442 –0.002 0.000 – – 
1986 0.054 0.111 0.104 0.444 –0.423 0.000 –0.004 – – 
1987 0.058 0.113 0.091 0.456 –0.419 0.004 0.005 – – 
1988 0.049 0.122 0.092 0.462 –0.419 0.001 0.054 – – 
1989 0.058 0.096 0.119 0.450 –0.411 0.003 –0.044 – – 
1990 0.059 0.084 0.133 0.450 –0.406 0.005 –0.002 – – 
1991 0.048 0.059 0.144 0.468 –0.298 0.014 –0.041 – – 
1992 0.042 0.054 0.148 0.464 –0.275 0.019 0.004 – – 
1993 0.037 0.036 0.172 0.468 –0.256 0.026 –0.026 – – 
1994 0.035 0.039 0.180 0.465 –0.269 0.019 0.005 – – 
1995 0.021 0.034 0.212 0.453 –0.263 0.010 0.027 – – 
1996 0.019 0.021 0.224 0.450 –0.239 0.015 0.007 – – 
1997 0.010 0.014 0.247 0.444 –0.233 0.012 –0.016 – – 
1998 0.003 0.019 0.237 0.452 –0.197 0.014 0.030 – – 
1999 0.003 0.019 0.242 0.441 –0.202 0.010 –0.020 – – 
2000 0.011 0.019 0.238 0.443 –0.213 0.008 –0.058 – – 
2001 0.010 0.021 0.228 0.443 –0.197 0.010 –0.045 – – 
2002 0.005 0.024 0.209 0.448 –0.144 0.014 –0.011 – – 
2003 0.010 0.026 0.203 0.444 –0.163 0.014 0.011 – – 
Very Small 0.085 0.035 0.184 0.527 –0.423 0.013 –0.007 – – 
Small –0.001 0.068 0.169 0.456 –0.215 0.013 –0.007 – – 
Medium 0.001 0.054 0.179 0.403 –0.175 0.008 –0.005 – – 
Large –0.003 0.070 0.149 0.385 –0.156 0.008 –0.006 – – 
Very Large –0.037 0.054 0.209 0.329 –0.155 0.006 –0.007 – – 
Public –0.014 0.060 0.175 0.365 –0.157 0.009 –0.006 – – 
Private 0.016 0.047 0.186 0.455 –0.197 0.010 –0.007 – – 
Foreign 0.091 0.047 0.176 0.541 –0.504 0.014 –0.007 – – 
India 0.014 0.059 0.163 0.440 –0.223 0.014 –0.007 – – 
Pakistan 0.065 0.035 0.214 0.479 –0.415 0.004 –0.007 – – 
Sample Mean 0.031 0.054 0.175 0.452 –0.288 0.010 –0.007 – – 
St. deviation 0.022 0.040 0.057 0.009 0.100 0.007 0.028 – – 
B. Marginal Variance (Risk) Effects 
1985 –0.051 –0.164 0.015 –0.209 –0.837 –0.051 –0.109 –1.406 0.400 
1986 –0.036 –0.001 0.048 –0.144 –0.928 –0.039 –0.070 –1.170 0.488 
1987 –0.037 –0.478 0.011 –0.084 –0.992 –0.067 –0.075 –1.722 0.486 
1988 –0.066 –0.030 0.013 –2.266 –1.076 –0.061 –0.145 –3.631 0.615 
1989 –0.027 –0.042 –0.012 –0.107 –0.162 –0.034 –0.058 –0.442 0.642 
1990 –0.030 –0.041 –0.012 –0.132 0.404 –0.022 –0.063 0.104 0.617 
1991 –0.004 –0.012 –0.001 –0.031 0.044 –0.010 –0.017 –0.031 0.377 
1992 –0.004 –0.016 0.005 –0.046 0.281 –0.011 –0.019 0.190 0.751 
1993 0.003 0.178 –0.002 –0.016 0.046 –0.004 –0.008 0.197 0.780 
1994 –0.896 –0.008 –0.005 –0.027 0.004 –0.008 –0.012 –0.952 0.752 
1995 0.003 –0.036 –0.002 –0.022 0.116 –0.008 –0.012 0.039 0.820 
1996 1.536 –0.010 –0.003 –0.014 0.029 –0.004 –0.008 1.526 0.794 
1997 –0.003 –0.001 –0.014 –0.009 0.018 –0.004 –0.006 –0.019 0.678 
1998 0.002 –0.002 0.059 –0.010 0.015 –0.004 –0.005 0.055 0.780 
1999 0.005 0.000 –0.008 0.069 0.028 –0.003 –0.006 0.085 0.623 
2000 0.006 –0.009 0.414 –0.042 0.097 –0.006 –0.009 0.451 0.707 
2001 –0.010 –0.001 0.025 –0.033 0.040 –0.004 –0.006 0.011 0.748 
2002 0.078 –0.011 –0.024 –0.027 0.061 –0.005 –0.007 0.065 0.691 
2003 0.068 0.003 –0.019 –0.039 0.087 –0.007 –0.011 0.082 0.650 
Very Small 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.741 
Small –0.002 –0.097 –0.005 0.004 –0.005 –0.001 –0.001 –0.107 0.631 
Medium –0.001 0.006 0.019 –0.002 –0.050 0.000 –0.002 –0.030 0.608 
Large 0.615 0.028 0.013 –0.762 –0.321 –0.008 –0.011 –0.446 0.593 
Very Large –0.380 –0.116 0.162 –0.251 –0.444 –0.104 –0.196 –1.329 0.564 
Public 0.110 -0.032 0.081 -0.457 –0.367 -0.050 –0.092 –0.807 0.580 
Private 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.665 
Foreign –0.001 –0.060 –0.003 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 –0.053 0.739 
India –0.085 –0.052 0.018 –0.206 –0.096 –0.024 –0.043 –0.384 0.633 
Pakistan 0.314 0.013 0.048 –0.039 –0.141 –0.002 –0.005 0.168 0.721 
Sample Mean 0.028 –0.036 0.026 –0.168 –0.143 –0.019 –0.034 –0.346 0.653 
St. deviation 0.420 0.122 0.096 0.512 0.449 0.021 0.041 1.079 0.132 
Note: TME is the total marginal effects computed as summing up input and output marginal effects. 
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The wage elasticity is on average –0.288 (the largest of the input elasticities) with 
a relatively small standard deviation of 0.10. In contrast to the results of Heshmati 
(2002), the elasticity of wages is decreasing over time, from –0.442 in 1985 to –0.163 in 
2003.  Although the sign of this variable is consistent with theory, such changes in 
elasticity over time contradict Heshmati (2002) and indicate that labour demand is 
becoming less and less responsive to changes in the wage rate.  This seems to indicate 
that banking reforms within the Indian sub-continent have not had the desired effect of 
making labour use more efficient.   
The elasticity with respect to fixed assets has a mean value of 0.010 with a 
relatively high standard deviation of 0.007. There is an upward trend in the elasticity of 
this input, starting at –0.002 in 1985 and ending at 0.014 in 2003.  Again, these results 
contrast with Heshmati (2002), and indicate an increasing demand for labour with the 
accumulation of fixed assets.  There must be significant differences in the degree to 
which the crowding out of labour as a result of changes in wage levels in the sub-
continent as compared to Sweden.   
The exogenous rate of technical change (consisting of only a neutral component) 
changes only over time. The sample mean value is –0.007, indicating very slight positive 
technical change (due to a slight reduction in labour usage). Technical change fluctuates 
from positive to negative before the turn of the 21st Century, with no clear trend 
established for more than a few tears at a time.  However, from 1999, there is a consistent 
positive technical change.  It would be interesting to see if this trend has continued post 
2003, and further study might seek to establish whether or not this apparent trend towards 
positive technical change is consistent throughout the decade. However, when taking the 
overall sample into account, it appears that there has been no definite trend in terms of 
technological progress or regress in the sub-continent over the years included in the 
study. 
The magnitude of the different output elasticities also appear to vary with the size 
of the individual bank in question.  Labour demand elasticity with respect to wages seems 
to fall as bank size increases. This illustrates that increased wage levels do not serve as 
great a deterrent to the hire of additional labour for larger banks as opposed to their 
smaller counterparts.  The elasticity with respect to branches decreases with size of bank, 
showing that larger banks are better able to expand their branching network without 
having the large effect on labour demand experienced by smaller banks across the sub-
continent.  Labour demand elasticity with respect to fixed assets seems to fall very 
slightly with the size of the bank in question (showing that increasing volumes of fixed 
assets requires less additional labour for larger banks).  Finally, the time trend shows very 
consistent amounts of technical change for all sizes of bank, meaning that the very small 
technical progress shown over the sample period has not been limited to banks of specific 
sizes.  Aside from these, there does not appear to be a definite trend with respect to the 
other input or output labour demand elasticities as bank size increases. 
In terms of elasticity differentiated by bank ownership, public banks have negative 
labour demand elasticities with respect to loans, while foreign banks have by far the 
largest elasticity with respect to this output. It seems that public banks in the sub-
continent are leading the way in reducing the labour intensity associated with marginal 
increases in the production of this output. Other differentials of note include foreign 
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banks having significantly more labour demand elasticity with respect to branches; while 
public banks have the lowest. This means that it is publicly owned banks that are able to 
expand their branch network with the smallest marginal impact on labour demand. This 
may be due to more efficient management and organization, or to economies of scale.  
Public banks also have the largest elasticity with respect to wages, with foreign banks 
having almost half the labour demand elasticity with respect to wages than their public 
counterparts.  Private, domestic banks are fairly close to public banks with regard to 
elasticities applicable to this particular input.  This means that domestic banks in the sub-
continent are far more responsive in their demand for labour when the wage rate changes 
than their foreign competitors. 
 
The Employment Variance 
The figures representing the following can be found in Appendix A (Section B).  
The beta coefficients with respect to ‘investment’ (y2), ‘deposits’ (y3) and ‘branches’ 
(y4) are all positive and statistically significant. The coefficient for ‘loans’ (y1) is 
however negative but statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level of significance. Of 
all of the input variables, the wage coefficient is by far the largest, and, as with Heshmati 
(2002) is both negative and strongly significant. Time specific dummy variables have a 
mixed signs and few of them statistically significant.  The coefficient applying to fixed 
assets is positive, but not significant. 
In common with Heshmati (2002), the employment variance elasticity or marginal 
risk effects are calculated with respect to the dispersion factors of ‘Outputs’, ‘Wages’, 
‘Fixed assets’ and ‘Time Trend’, with mean values being estimated separately for each 
year, size of bank, type of bank and country. These results, together with the overall 
sample mean, are reported in second part of Table 3. Marginal variance (risk) effects 
evaluated at the mean of the data with respect to ‘loans’, ‘investment’,  ‘deposits’ and 
‘branches’ are generally negative. Positive marginal effects are observed for wages in 
post deregulation period.  In all cases the standard deviations are large and, for some 
variables, are in excess of the mean value itself. Thus, generally for banks with 
production levels close to the sample means, the employment variance decreases if the 
bank produces more output.   
The variables ‘Wages’ and ‘Branches’ are the most important factors contributing 
to the variance of employment in terms of marginal effects. The signs of marginal effects 
are, on the whole, as expected.  Significantly more variation in the estimated marginal 
effects seems to take place almost uniformly as bank size increases. Some of the inputs 
and outputs seem to demonstrate significant variation in their respective marginal effects 
over time (notably loans, branches and wages), while the remaining inputs and outputs 
display fairly consistent marginal effects over time. 
 
Technical Efficiency 
The efficiency measured here is a relative efficiency, as it is measured relative to 
the bank demonstrating ‘best-practice’ in each year.  This individual bank is assumed to 
be 100 percent efficient. The mean values of estimates of technical efficiency obtained 
from Equation (6) are reported in Table 3 by year, bank size, type of bank and country. 
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Technical efficiency is both bank and time-specific. The overall mean technical 
efficiency is 65.3 percent with a standard deviation 0.132.  This means that, on average, 
banks in the sub-continent could have reduced their labour usage by 34.7 percent with 
output remaining constant.  This is indicative of a relatively low level of mean labour use 
efficiency displayed by banks in the sub-continent over the sample period. 
However, what is apparent from investigating the changes in labour use efficiency 
over time is that the financial reforms initiated in the 1990s have helped to improve the 
efficiency of labour demand within banks, as the mean technical efficiency over time is 
increasing. In 1985, the average commercials bank in the sub-continent showed only 40 
percent labour use efficiency, compared with 65 percent in the final year of the sample 
period, and a high of 82 percent in 1995. The year on year change is largest between 
1990 and 1992 (despite a small adjustment ‘blip in 1991), which is indicative of the 
success of the round of reforms introduced in 1992.  There appears to be a noticeable 
variation in technical efficiency over the bank size. As was concluded in the study of 
Heshmati (2002), there is found to be a negative relationship between the level of 
technical efficiency and the size of banks. In a relative sense, very small banks operate 
with a more technically optimal size of labour than do very large banks. The results 
indicate that the largest banks could reduce their labour demand on average by 43.6 
percent.   Therefore, there is a very significant gap between the optimal level of labour 
efficiency, and that, which is observed in the largest banks within the sub-continent.  The 
very smallest sub-continental banks were found to be slightly inefficient in labour usage, 
and could have reduced labour usage by 25.9 percent.  
Among banks of different ownership types, it was found that foreign banks were 
the most efficient in terms of labour usage, followed by private domestic and public 
domestic commercials banks respectively.  Foreign banks could have reduced their labour 
usage by 26.1 percent, private banks by 33.5 percent and public banks by 42 percent, 
indicating that publicly owned commercials banks in the sub-continent are employing far 
more labour than is technically necessary given output levels, and still have some way to 
go in improving technical efficiency levels in the future.  The frequency distribution of 
technical efficiency is reported in Table 4. A significant number of banks are found in the 
intervals of between 60 percent and 80 percent labour usage efficiency. 
  
Table 4 
Frequency Distribution of Technical Efficiency 
Percentage Efficiency Interval Frequency Percentage 
10–50 273 16.24 
50–60 243 14.46 
60–70 428 25.46 
70–80 459 27.31 
80–90 206 12.25 
90–100 72 4.28 
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The correlation coefficients of ranking of efficiencies are reported in Table 5. This 
study concludes that there is a negative correlation between efficiency and the size of 
bank, while a positive relationship is found between efficiency and time. We find a 
positive association between both the input and output variance effects and time, which is 
significant for the former, but not for the latter. We also find a negative relationship 
between the input and output variance effects and bank size where input and output 
variance effects refer to the sum of total marginal effects with respect to input and output 
variables. 
 
Table 5 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients (Figures in Brackets are Significance Levels) 
 Characteristics Marginal Variance (Risk Effects) 
 Time Size TME Output Input Efficiency 
Time 1.000      
 (0.002)      
Size –0.075 1.000     
 (0.002) (0.017)     
TME 0.028 –0.058 1.000    
 (0.255) (0.017) (0.000)    
Output 0.019 –0.057 0.991 1.000   
 (0.444) (0.019) (0.000) (0.774)   
Input 0.148 –0.129 0.142 0.007 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.774) (0.000)  
Efficiency 0.475 –0.447 0.023 0.017 0.146 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.351) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to examine the efficiency of labour use in both India and 
Pakistan during a period of modernisation and deregulation.  Data from 73 Indian and 41 
Pakistani banks have been analysed over the period 1985–2003.  A flexible translog 
functional form is used where demand for labour is a function of wages, fixed inputs and 
a time trend.  Of those outputs and inputs elasticities are largely as expected.  The largest 
elasticity is with respect to wages, which have a strong negative elasticity.  Of outputs, 
branches have the most effect upon labour demand, with a strong, positive elasticity.   
The most interesting conclusions from this study are those that illustrate technical 
efficiency levels.  The average level of technical inefficiency across the sample was 
relatively low, as was expected.  It was found that, on average, banks in the sub-continent 
could have reduced their labour usage by 34.7 percent with output remaining constant. 
However, the sub-continent was generally experiencing increases in labour efficiency 
across the nineteen years of the study, indicating that policies enacted in the early and late 
1990s to assist banks in the reduction of their labour use were reasonably successful. This 
level of efficiency varies inversely with bank size as expected. The results indicate that 
the largest commercial banks could reduce their labour demand on average by 43.6 
percent. The very smallest banks were found to be slightly more efficient on average in 
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terms of labour usage, which could have been reduced by 25.9 percent. Among banks of 
different ownership types, it was found that foreign banks were the most efficient in 
terms of labour usage, followed by private domestic and public domestic commercial 
banks respectively.   
It would appear that the significant financial reforms of the last decade in the 
Indian subcontinent over the last decade have reduced the degree of over-usage of labour 
in its banking sectors.  There still exists, however, a fairly large degree of inefficiency in 
terms of labour usage, particularly among the very large banks of the subcontinent.  It 
appears that the number of branches that are owned by a bank have the greatest impact on 
the demand for labour and, if the outcome of more efficient labour usage is to be 
achieved, more emphasis needs to be placed on those large banks with an extensive 
network of branches. These are most likely to be the banks that have previously been 
publicly owned, and therefore may have encountered difficulties meeting the challenges 
of the new competitive environment.  It may be deemed that additional effort needs to be 
made to streamline these large banks if the desired efficiency gains are to be made. 
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Appendix A 
 
GLS Parameter Estimates of the Labour Demand and Nonlinear Least Square  
Estimates of the Variance Function (Combined) 
A. Labour Demand Function 
a0 1.8769** 0.1418 d12 –0.8053** 0.0885 d68 –2.8301** 0.2421 
ay1 –0.0241 0.0315 d13 –0.9500** 0.0725 d69 –3.0724** 0.2429 
ay2 0.0901** 0.0232 d14 –1.1713** 0.0957 d70 –2.8792** 0.2429 
ay3 0.0612* 0.0344 d15 –1.2362** 0.1120 d71 –2.0926** 0.2493 
ay4 0.4912** 0.0441 d16 –1.1402** 0.1131 d72 –3.0830** 0.2403 
aw –0.1204** 0.0290 d17 –0.9401** 0.1039 d73 –2.4219** 0.2375 
aq 0.0083 0.0101 d18 –1.0788** 0.0990 d74 –1.9263** 0.1396 
ay11 0.0269 0.0236 d19 –1.4766** 0.1016 d75 –1.8993** 0.2411 
ay22 0.0149** 0.0033 d20 –1.2957** 0.1155 d76 –2.1077** 0.2357 
ay33 0.0278 0.0235 d21 –1.5890** 0.1455 d77 –2.2246** 0.2312 
ay44 0.0121 0.0066 d22 –1.6336** 0.1557 d78 –1.7513** 0.2366 
aww 0.0744** 0.0175 d23 –1.4813** 0.1374 d79 –2.7398** 0.2297 
aqq –0.0003 0.0031 d24 –1.5322** 0.1220 d80 –2.5103** 0.2401 
ay12 –0.0211 0.0184 d25 –1.4590** 0.1212 d81 –2.0333** 0.2449 
ay13 0.0556 0.0428 d26 –1.4947** 0.1284 d82 –3.0176** 0.2299 
ay14 –.0316* 0.0141 d27 –.5407** 0.1410 d83 –.8897** 0.2664 
ay1w –.0533 0.0312 d28 –.9401** 0.1717 d84 –.0300** 0.1887 
ay1q –.0706** 0.0141 d29 –1.9097** 0.1681 d85 –2.6177** 0.2400 
ay23 –0.0803** 0.0219 d30 –2.0338** 0.1728 d86 –2.2349** 0.2331 
ay24 0.0512** 0.0098 d31 –1.9453** 0.1749 d87 –2.6660** 0.2469 
ay2w 0.1384** 0.0195 d32 –2.1090** 0.1715 d88 –1.8077** 0.2421 
ay2q 0.0111 0.0087 d33 –2.0121** 0.1874 d89 –2.2207** 0.2429 
ay34 –0.0812** 0.0183 d34 –2.2942** 0.1908 d90 –2.9928** 0.2360 
ay3w –0.2123** 0.0409 d35 –2.1664** 0.1749 d91 –2.3572** 0.2374 
ay3q 0.0555** 0.0176 d36 –2.2752** 0.1787 d92 –2.4372** 0.2388 
ay4w 0.1189** 0.0137 d37 –2.1646** 0.1799 d93 –2.7708** 0.2285 
ay4q 0.0014 0.0046 d38 –2.3285** 0.1983 d94 –2.4817** 0.2425 
awq 0.0290** 0.0116 d39 –2.4739** 0.1895 d95 –1.2751** 0.1003 
C2 0.0127 0.0154 d40 –2.1861** 0.1903 d96 –2.4669** 0.2393 
C3 0.0088 0.0162 d41 –2.3707** 0.2170 d97 –3.1033** 0.2462 
C4 0.0508** 0.0169 d42 –2.6330** 0.1982 d98 –2.8417** 0.2385 
C5 0.0213 0.0177 d43 –2.5258** 0.2081 d99 –2.8174** 0.2381 
C6 0.0198 0.0185 d44 –2.3914** 0.2050 d100 –1.7112** 0.1179 
C7 –0.0002 0.0235 d45 –2.3704** 0.1959 d101 –1.4452** 0.1106 
C8 –0.0042 0.0245 d46 –2.8769** 0.2137 d102 –2.7886** 0.2345 
C9 –0.0205 0.0264 d47 –2.3685** 0.2146 d103 –2.6981** 0.2393 
C10 –0.0197 0.0262 d48 –2.6190** 0.2175 d104 –2.4645** 0.2339 
C11 –0.0009 0.0270 d49 –2.8671** 0.2154 d105 –2.7785** 0.2387 
C12 –0.0108 0.0282 d50 –3.1282** 0.2481 d106 –3.0457** 0.2368 
C13 –0.0367 0.0294 d51 –1.3382** 0.2422 d107 –2.8658** 0.2443 
C14 –0.0233 0.0307 d52 –1.3213** 0.2179 d108 –2.6618** 0.2367 
C15 –0.0369 0.0309 d53 –1.2972** 0.2309 d109 –1.9528** 0.2382 
C16 –0.0858** 0.0310 d54 –1.3505** 0.2452 d110 –2.8477** 0.2476 
C17 –0.1330** 0.0319 d55 –1.7387** 0.2474 d111 –2.2803** 0.2309 
C18 –0.1493** 0.0331 d56 –1.2204** 0.2286 d112 –1.4467** 0.1092 
C19 –0.1426** 0.0329 d57 –1.9500** 0.2483 Quality –0.0089* 0.0046 
D2 –1.4880** 0.1400 d58 –1.9285** 0.2399 Risk 0.0417 0.0298 
D3 –1.4960** 0.1470 d59 –2.3957** 0.2408 B. Variance Function 
D4 –1.4838** 0.1467 d60 –2.1982** 0.2411 by1 0.0025 0.0035 
D5 –1.3719** 0.1417 d61 –2.6138** 0.2419 by2 0.0006 0.0028 
D6 –1.4947** 0.1538 d62 –2.9448** 0.2419 by3 –0.0049 0.0051 
D7 –1.5394** 0.1685 d63 –3.0255** 0.2433 by4 –0.0036 0.0037 
D8 –1.7031** 0.1687 d64 –1.9438** 0.2433 bw 0.0552** 0.0039 
D9 –0.9720** 0.0836 d65 –2.9248** 0.2398 bq 0.0029 0.0030 
D10 –0.8144** 0.0667 d66 –2.9842** 0.2444 bt 0.0050** 0.0003 
D11 –0.8615** 0.0840 d67 –2.9127** 0.2404 σ2v 5.7433  
Note: ** Significant at 1 percent, * 5 percent. 
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